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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3613 
_____________ 
 
WAYNE HARRISON; MARY HARRISON 
 
v. 
 
CABOT OIL & GAS CORPORATION, 
                                                                       Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 3-10-cv-00312) 
District Judge:  Hon. Robert D. Mariani 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2015 
 
Before:   JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed: June 25, 2015) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
 Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation (“Cabot Oil”) appeals from the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Wayne Harrison and Mary Harrison on its counterclaim.  We will 
affirm. 
 After briefing was completed in this appeal, we petitioned for certification of the 
following question to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: “When an oil and gas lessor 
files an unsuccessful lawsuit to invalidate a lease, is the lessee entitled to an equitable 
extension of the primary lease term equal to the length of time the lawsuit was pending?”  
Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 12-3613, at 7 (3d Cir. Apr. 7, 2014).  That Court 
granted our petition and issued a thorough and thoughtful opinion on February 17, 2015.  
In answering our question, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared, “We do not 
foreclose that equitable relief may be available to oil-and-gas-producing companies – 
subject to applicable requirements governing recourse to equity – where there is an 
affirmative repudiation of a lease.”  Harrison v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 110 A.3d 178, 
186 (Pa. 2015).  But, the Court continued, “the mere pursuit of declaratory relief 
challenging the validity of a lease does not amount to such.”  Id.  It explained that it “has 
required more than the mere assertion of a challenge to the validity of an agreement to 
demonstrate such repudiation.  Under Pennsylvania law, anticipatory repudiation or 
breach requires an ‘absolute and unequivocal refusal to perform or a distinct and positive 
statement of an inability to do so.’”  Id. at 184 (quoting 2401 Pa. Ave. Corp. v. Fed’n of 
Jewish Agencies of Greater Phila., 489 A.2d 733, 736 (Pa. 1985)). 
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 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion effectively resolves the sole issue on 
appeal.  Cabot Oil’s counterclaim sought equitable relief based on the request in the 
Harrisons’ amended complaint for a declaration that the lease was invalid.1  Because “the 
mere pursuit of declaratory relief challenging the validity of a lease does not amount to 
[repudiation],” id. at 186, the District Court properly granted summary judgment against 
Cabot Oil on its counterclaim. 
 Cabot Oil acknowledges that, in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
decision, it cannot prevail on a theory of repudiation.  But it argues that its counterclaim 
is also based on a number of other equitable theories, including estoppel, unjust 
enrichment, and avoidance of contractual forfeiture.  Because the Commonwealth’s 
Supreme Court did not address those alternative theories, Cabot Oil urges us to do so 
now. 
 Contrary to Cabot Oil’s assertion, however, its counterclaim was based solely, and 
explicitly, on a theory of repudiation.  In its briefing before us, Cabot Oil did briefly 
discuss alternative theories that other jurisdictions have used to justify the equitable relief 
it seeks, but its briefing focuses, appropriately, on the one theory actually alleged in its 
counterclaim: repudiation.  Other theories of relief are therefore not properly before us.  
                                              
 1 In their amended complaint, the Harrisons also sought, in the alternative, an 
order compelling Cabot Oil to pay fair market value for the lease.  But Cabot Oil only 
alleged repudiation on the basis of the Harrisons’ request for declaratory relief.  Thus any 
claim of repudiation based the Harrisons’ request for just compensation has been 
forfeited.  See Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 641-42 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(treating as forfeited a claim that was neither raised in complaint nor added by 
amendment). 
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See Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 641-42 (3d Cir. 1993) (treating 
as forfeited a claim that was neither raised in complaint nor added by amendment). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
